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I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to maintain and preserve their thousand miles of
coastline from the hazards of oil spills, the state of Washington has
enacted a state statute imposing standards for oil tanker operations
that exceed those required by federal law. Intertanko, the world's
largest independent tanker organization, argued that the law, which
requires oil tankers and onshore oil facilities to prepare and submit
spill prevention and response plans, exceeds the state's authority.
Intertanko sought an order in federal court declaring the state statute
unconstitutional.
On November 18, 1996, U.S. District Court Judge John
Coughenour ruled that Washington's oil spill prevention law does not
violate the Constitution, does not conflict with international
agreements, and is not preempted by federal law.' In its argument,
Intertanko relied on a number of federal statutes, regulations, and
international treaty obligations to assert that the state statute and
regulations improperly intrude into a field controlled by federal
government.' They also relied upon a handful of treaties to which the
United States has acceded. However, the Court disagreed, holding
that the law legitimately protects the state's "delicate and valuable
marine resources through the exercise of the state's police powers."3
One argument not advanced by the plaintiffs was that the state
statute also violates the Right of Innocent Passage contained in the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. ("Convention").4
1 The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko)
v. Lowry, 947 F.Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1996) [hereinafterlntertanko v. Lowry],
affdinpart andrev'd inpart, Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1998).
2 Id
3 Id. at 1500.
4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982,
Art. 17, Part II, Sec. 3, 10 U.N.T.S. 26 [hereinafter Convention].
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I will be exploring this argument and the impact it may have had on
the Court's reasoning. Part II examines the events leading up to the
dispute between Intertanko and Washington State including a brief
history of Washington's environmental concerns, a discussion of the
federal response to these concerns, and an analysis of the actual
statute that forms the basis for this dispute. Part III will provide an
analysis of Intertanko's District Court argument opposing the
Washington statute as well as the Court's holding and reasoning. Part
IV will provide the alternative argument I am the U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea. This will include a brief history of the
Convention, its authority as international law, and an analysis of the
applicable parts of the Convention. Finally, Part V concludes that
had Intertanko advanced the argument that the Washington State
statute violates foreign vessels' Right of Innocent Passage, it may
have made a difference in the ruling made at the district court level.5
II. PRELUDE To INTERTANKO v LOWRY
A. History of Environmental Concerns of Washington State
It is a well conceded point that environmental damage caused
by oil spills from oil tankers and barges can have a devastating effect
on a state's natural resources. A well-known example in the United
States is the wreck of the Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound,
5 Since the drafting of this article, Intertanko's argument has become lost
again, this time on appeal. See Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1998).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal refused to hear arguments on the right of
innocent passage doctrine because Intertanko did not raise this issue in the lower
court.
This is only further support for the contention that had this argument been
asserted in the District Court level, Intertanko stood a possible chance of winning
their case. However, the argument and courts' ears will remain like ships passing
in the night.
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Alaska, in March 1989.6 Another example is the 231,000 gallons of
oil that spilled from the Nestucca oil barge in Washington near Gray
Harbor in December 1988. 7 Threats of potential environmental
devastation lend special concern to states such as Washington, where
their waters are especially unique and valuable.
The marine waters of Washington include a rocky ocean
coastline, the "inland sea" of Puget Sound, and the Straight of Juan
de Fuca.8 These irreplaceable waters contain a very rich and diverse
ecosystem. Their fisheries, shellfish, and habitat resources, as well
as their undeniable aesthetic value, allow these waters to play an
important role in the state's economic and tourism base. The waters
also provide a unique educational and resource opportunity for
students, citizens, and marine environmental professionals.
Aside from this obvious desire to protect their valuable
ecosystem, Washington has additional financial motivations for
ensuring their coastlines remain protected from oil spill devastation.
There are numerous recreational opportunities that their marine
waters provide through the state park system. Activities such as
picnicking, camping, beach combing, windsurfing, clam digging, bird
watching, scuba diving, water skiing, and swimming attracted
55,917,511 visitors to state parks on or adjacent to Puget Sound in
1995.1 The Washington Department of Natural Resources also
manages aquatic lands by the leasing of boot moorage, marine
terminals, and bedlands for shellfish harvest. In 1995, the revenue
6 Grounded Tanker Spills 270, 000 Barrels of Oil off Alaska, Associated
Press, Mar. 24, 1989.
7 Oil Slick Kills, Imperils Birds Along State Coast, Seattle Times, Dec. 24,
1988, at A8.
8 Intertanko v. Lowry, 947 F.Supp. at 1488.
9 State Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial




generated from the management of these state-owned aquatic lands
totaled $9,983,858.1 In addition, the assessed valuation ofresidential
waterfront property in some areas of Puget Sound exceeds $2 million
per acre." The property taxes generated by these property values
flow directly to the local governments.
Many people have long identified clean waters, salmon
fishing, and other seafood resources with Washington State. This has
provided an incentive for businesses and families to move to the state.
There is no doubt that future oil spills would result in economic
disaster and community loss for Washington waters.
B. Federal Response of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
In response to the states' rapidly emerging concerns of
environmental damage caused by oil spills from oil tankers, and more
specifically, in direct response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince
William Sound, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
("OPA 901).12 The Act created a comprehensive prevention, removal,
liability, and compensation regime for dealing with oil pollution
caused by vessels.13
In various provisions of the Act, Congress tried to define how
some of the new provisions would relate to existing law. One of
these provisions is Section 1018(a) of OPA 90 (104 Stat. 505), found
10 Id.
II Id.
12 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-380, 1018 Stat. 575 (August
18, 1990). See The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
(Intertanko) v. Lowry, 947 F.Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1996), afd in part and
rev'd in part, Intertanko v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1998).
13 Intertanko v. Lowry, 947 F.Supp. at 1491.
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in Title I of the statute (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2718). 14 That
provision provides:
Nothing in this Act . . . shall . .. affect, or be
construed or interpreted as preempting, the authority
of any State or political sub-division thereof from
imposing any additional liability or requirements with
respect to . . . (A) the discharge of oil or other
pollution by oil within such State; or (B) any removal
activities in connection with such a discharge. 5
In addition, Section 1018(c) provides:
Nothing in this Act .... shall in any way affect, or be
construed to affect, the authority of the United States
or any State or political subdivision thereof.... (1) to
impose additional liability or additional requirements;
or (2) to impose, or to determine the amount of, any
fine or penalty (whether criminal or civil in nature) for
any violation of law; relating to the discharge or
substantial threat of a discharge, of oil."
Washington claims that this non-preemption language
recognizes the right of states to impose additional requirements to
prevent oil spills. 7 Intertanko, on the other hand, asserts that this







removal, but not prevention."8 In addition, Intertanko argues that
Congress said that it was not "in this Act" preventing the states from
imposing some forms of requirements different from federal
standards." Specifically, Congress' language does not necessarily
mean that some other Act or recognized body of law might not
provide a prohibition against such legislation.2"
C. Washington State's Response to OPA 90
Following its belief that OPA 90 authorized states to
supplement this federal law and desiring to provide the ultimate
protection possible to their marine waters, Washington State enacted
a comprehensive law, addressing the issues of oil pollution at the
state level.2 One part of the law establishes the Office of Marine
Safety (OMS) and directs it to establish standards in rules for oil spill
prevention plans that provide the "best achievable protection"
("BAP") from damages caused by the discharge of oil into the waters
of the state.2 The law requires owners and operators of tank vessels
to submit oil spill prevention plans that conform with these newly
established rules to OMS.2 It also requires vessels that merely transit
Washington waters while sailing to other U.S. or Canadian ports to
provide prior notice before the tanker can enter state waters. The law
also requires that this notice report any conditions that pose a hazard
18 Id
19 Id at 1491-2.
20 Id at 1496.
21 See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 88A6.010 et seq; Wash. Admin. Code
§§317-21-010 etseq.
22 See Wash. Rev. Code §88.46.040.
23 Id
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to the vessel or to the marine environment. 24 Failure to file
acceptable plans, subjects violators to statutory penalties and a
prohibition on.calling at Washington ports.'
Intertanko has challenged sixteen (16) of these regulations,
claiming they are invalid.26 These regulations lay out specific
requirements that tanker vessel operators must satisfy in order to meet
the BAP standards in their prevention plans.27 They may be
summarized as follows:
WAC 317-21-130, Event Reporting. Requires
operators to report all events such as collisions,
allisons, and near-miss incidents for the five years
preceding filing of a prevention plan, and all events
that occur for tankers that operate in Puget Sound.
WAC 317-21-130, Operating Procedures-Watch
Practices. Requires tankers to employ specific watch
and lookout practices while navigating and when at
anchor, and requires a bridge resource management
system that is the "standard practice throughout the
owner's or operator's fleet," and which organizes
responsibilities and coordinates communication
between members of the bridge.
WAC 317-21-205, Operating Procedures--Navigation.
Requires tankers in navigation in state waters to report
its positions every fifteen minutes, to write a
comprehensive voyage plan before entering state
24 Id
25 See Wash. Rev. Code §88.46.090; Wash. Admin. Code §317-21-020.




waters, and to make frequent compass checks while
under way.
WAC 317-21-210, Operating Procedures -
Engineering. Requires tankers in state waters to
follow specified engineering and monitoring
practices.
WAC 317-21-215, Operating Procedures -Prearrival
Tests and Inspections. Requires tankers to undergo a
number of tests and inspections of engineering,
navigation, and propulsion systems twelve hours or
less before entering or getting underway in state
waters.
WAC 317-21-220, Operating Procedures -
Emergency Procedures. Requires tanker masters to
post written crew assignments and procedures for a
number of shipboard emergencies.
WAC 317-21-225, Operating Procedures - Events.
Requires that when an event transpires in state waters,
such as a collision, allision, or near-miss incident, the
operator is prohibited from erasing, discarding or
altering the position plotting records and the
comprehensive written voyage plan
WAC 317-21-230, Personnel Policies - Training.
Requires operators to provide a comprehensive
training program for personnel that goes beyond that
necessary to obtain a license or merchant marine
document, and which includes instructions on a
number of specific procedures.
WAC 317-21-235, Personnel Policies - Illicit Drugs
1998-99]
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and Alcohol Use. Requires drug and alcohol testing
and reporting.
WAC 317-21-240, Personnel Policies - Personnel
Evaluation. Requires operators to monitor the fitness
for duty of crew members, and requires operators to at
least annually provide a job performance and safety
evaluation for all crew members on vessels covered
by a prevention plan who serve more than six months
a year.
WAC 317-21-245, Personnel Policies - Work Hours.
Sets limitations on the number of hours crew
members may work.
WAC 317-21-250, Personnel Policies - Language.
Requires all licensed deck officers and the vessel
master to be proficient in English and to speak a
language understood by subordinate officers and
unlicensed crew. Also requires all written instruction
to be printed in a language understood by the licensed
officers and unlicensed crew.
WAC 317-21-255, Personnel Policies - Record
Keeping. Requires operators to maintain training
records for crew members assigned to vessels covered
by a prevention plan.
WAC 317-21-260, Management. Requires operators
to implement management practices that demonstrate
active monitoring of vessel operations and
maintenance, personnel training, development and
fitness, and technological improvements in
navigation.
WAC 317-21-265, Technology. Requires tankers to
[Vol. 7
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be equipped with global positioning system receivers,
two separate radar systems, and an emergency towing
system.
WAC 317-21-540, Advance Notice of Entry and
Safety Reports. Requires at least twenty-four hours
notice prior to entry of a tanker into state waters, and
requires that the notice report any conditions that pose
a hazard to the vessel or the marine environment.28
ll. INTERTANKO v. LOWRY
A. Intertanko 's Argument Below
Intertanko sought an order declaring that these Washington
statutes and regulations were unconstitutional.29 Most of the federal
law relied upon by Intertanko in its motion for summary judgment is
derived from the Tank Vessel Act of 1936, the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act of 1972 ("PWSA"), the Port and Tanker Safety Act of
1978 ("PTSA"), and OPA 90.30 These acts either added to or
amended prior law regarding the regulation of oil tankers.3' They
either imposed specific requirements for tankers or delegated to the
Coast Guard the responsibility for promulgating specific standards.32
Intertanko also relied on a handful of treaties to which the
United States has acceded including the International Convention for
28 Id
29 Id at 1488.
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the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 ("SOLAS"), the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, and the
Protocol of 1978 ("MARPOL"), the International Convention on
Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers,
1978 ("STCW"), and the International Regulation for Preventing
Collisions at Sea, 1973 ("COLREGS"). 3
Intertanko argued that the BAP rules were preempted by these
federal statutes, regulations, and treaty obligations pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.' It also argued
that the BAP rules violated the Foreign Affairs Clause and the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution." And finally,
Intertanko argued that the BAP rules were invalid because they
reached beyond the three-mile territorial limit of the navigable waters
of Washington state.36
B. The Court's Response and Reasoning
The Court reasoned that, pursuant to the broad language of
§ 1018 of OPA 90, none of the provisions of OPA 90 preempted the
ability of the states to add to the federal requirements in the areas
addressed by the Act." The language reemphasized that the Act
broadly reserved to states the ability to impose additional
requirements with respect to oil pollution.38 By conducting an overall
review of the language, structure, and legislative history of the Act,
33 Id at 1489-90.
34 Id at 1490.
35 Id
36 Id
37 Id at 1491.
38 Id. at 1492.
[Vol. 7
Intertanko v. Lowry
the Court concluded that OPA 90's express nonpreemption language,
applied to the BAP regulations which govern tanker operations,
personnel, management, technology, and information reporting. 9
These BAP regulations cover similar ground addressed by the
prevention provisions of OPA 90, which set standards for tanker
personnel qualifications, manning, operations, design, and
construction.4" In the Court's view, the Act made clear that Congress
placed a high priority on reducing the threat of oil pollution and
permitted states to impose additional requirements to meet these
goals.
4 1
As for the implied field preemption argument, the Court
agreed that the areas addressed by the BAP regulations covering
tanker operations, personnel, management, technology, and
information reporting were also comprehensively regulated by federal
statutes, regulations and treaty obligations.42 However, the Court did
not state that comprehensive regulation of an area alone is enough to
infer preemption. The Court held that there must be an additional
showing that Congress intended the comprehensive nature of the
regulation to foreclose state action.43 Since the BAP standards are
intended to protect the environment, they are an exercise ofthe state's
police powers. An unavoidable overlap of state and federal
regulations occurs when vessels are involved. However, when
pollution is a concern, the Ninth Circuit has recognized the need for
joint federal/state regulation ofthe ocean waters within three miles of
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shore.44
As for the express preemption argument, the Court reasoned
that Congress did not intend to give the Coast Guard authority to
preempt state law with regard to the oil spills. 45 This reason was due
to the nonpreemption language of OPA 90 § 1018.
Conflict preemption was not present in the Court's view
because compliance with state and federal law would not be a
physical impossibility.46 In fact, the state regulations complimented
the federal goal of reducing human error as a major cause of maritime
casualties.47 In response to Intertanko's argument that the BAP
regulations unconstitutionally limited commerce, the Court disagreed
and held that a state law does not directly regulate interstate
commerce merely because it concretely affects a business engaged in
interstate commerce. 48 The BAP regulations were not impermissibly
aimed at regulating commerce, or impeding interstate trade to protect
state business interests. 49 The statutes and regulations were instead
merely intended to protect local waters from pollution."0 The Court
emphasized that Intertanko must show the burdens that the
regulations impose on interstate commerce clearly outweigh the local
benefits.51 Unfortunately, Intertanko had not presented sufficient
facts to prove an inequitable balance such that a Commerce Clause
44 Chevron v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483,489 (9th Cir. 1984).
45 Intertanko v. Lowry, 947 F.Supp. at 1496
46 Id at 1497.
47 Id
48 Id. at 1498.
49 Id
50 Id
51 Id at 1497.
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violation would be present.
As for Intertanko's Foreign Affairs Clause argument, the
Court claimed it was rare for a state statute to be invalidated due to
its intrusion into the realm of foreign affairs.52 The Court reasoned
that Washington State was not acting in the federal government's
place vis-a-vis a foreign or international body, but instead was
exercising its police power by regulating both foreign and domestic
tankers to protect the environment.53 Since the state's decisions in
this area are not keyed to any judgment as to the worthiness of a
foreign regime, the Foreign Affairs Clause challenge could not be
sustained?'
This Court also addressed Intertanko's argumentthatthe BAP
regulations affect tankers beyond the three-mile limit imposed by the
Washington Constitution.55 Further, the Supreme Court has upheld
state police power regulations that incidentally and indirectly affect
interstate or foreign commerce outside of state waters.5 6 Also, the
Court pointed out that the Washington Supreme Court has upheld the
authority of the state to prohibit the possession or transportation of
salmon taken from beyond the state's three-mile limit.57 The bottom
line is that the courts have allowed some incidental impact on
extraterritorial activities if the goal is protection of state resources.
Overall, the Court held that the BAP regulations are
52 Id at 1499.
53 Id
54 Id
55 WASH. CONST. arL XXIV, § 1.
56 See Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422, 426, 56 S.Ct. 513,
515, 80 L.Ed. 772 (1936)(denying challenge to California law restricting the use
of sardines caught outside of state waters).
57 See Frach v. Schoettler, 46 Wash.2d 281, 290, 280 P.2d 1038, cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 838,76 S.Ct. 75, 100 L.Ed. 747 (1955).
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constitutionally valid. They are not preempted by federal law, do not
violate the Commerce Clause or the Foreign Affairs Clause, nor are
they improper extraterritorial restrictions. Rather, the state laws act
to legitimately protect Washington's delicate and valuable marine
resources through the exercise of the state's police powers.
IV. THE ARGUMENT NOT MADE
A. The Right of Innocent Passage
The sea covers more than 70 percent of the surface of the
globe. The United States has always had basic and enduring interests
in the oceans and has consistently taken the view that the wide range
of these interests is best protected through a widely accepted
international framework governing the uses of the sea. The goal of
the United States has always been to develop a comprehensive treaty
on the law of the sea which will be respected by all countries, and to
which they could become a party. With this in mind, the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("the Convention") was
completed in Montego Bay on December 10, 1982.58
The Convention sets forth a comprehensive fi-amework
governing the uses of the oceans. It was adopted by the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea which met between 1973
and 1982 to negotiate a comprehensive treaty relating to the law of
the sea.59 The Convention was signed by the United States on July
29, 1994 and forwarded to the Senate of the United States for advice
as well as consent of the Senate to accession and ratification. 0
Although the Senate has not acted on the Convention as of
yet, its intermediary authority can be derived from comments of then
58 Convention, supra note 5, Preface.
59 See Bernard H. Oxman, The New Law ofthe Sea, 69 A.B.A. J. 157(1983).
60 Convention, supra note 5, Letter of Transmittal.
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President Ronald Reagan when he declared that the Convention was
declaratory and customary international law for almost all of its
provisions except those on deep sea bed mining.61 For all intents and
purposes, the substantive provisions dealing with pollution are
currently accepted as customary international law.62 Within the
Convention lies the important legal doctrine of the Right of Innocent
Passage ("RIP").' This fundamental principle of the international
law of the sea embodies the concept that all ships enjoy the right of
innocent passage through another State's territorial sea.'  T h e
principle of RIP is expressed in Article 17 of Part II, Section 3 of the
Convention. This article provides that, "Subject to this Convention,
ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of
innocent passage through the territorial sea."'65 The territorial sea has
been defined as the twelve nautical miles measured seaward from the
coast or baselines delimiting internal waters.66
The term "passage" is further defined in Article 18 of Part II,
Section 3 of the Convention. This article provides:
1. Passage means navigation through the territorial
sea for the purpose of: (a) traversing that sea without
entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or
port facility outside internal waters; or (b) proceeding
to or from internal waters or a call at such a roadstead
61 1 PUB. PAPERS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN at 378-79 (1983).
See LOUIS HENKINET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1387 (3d ed. 1993).
63 Convention, supra note 5, Art 17, Part II, Sec. 3.
64 United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 197,95 S.Ct. 2240,2250,45 L.Ed.
2d 109 (1975). This right of innocent passage does not include a right of overflight
or submerged passage.
65 Convention, supra note 5, 1982, Arts. 17, Part II, Sec. 3..
66 Oxman, supra note 59.
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or port facility.
2. Passage shall be continuous and expeditious.
However, passage includes stopping and anchoring,
but only in so far as the same are incidental to
ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary to force
majeure or distress or for the purpose of rendering
assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger or
distress.67
The meaning of "innocent passage" is further explored in
Article 19 of Part II, Section 3 of the Convention. This article
provides:
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial
to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
state. Such passage shall take place in conformity
with this convention and with other rules of
international law.
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the
coastal state if in the territorial sea it engages in any of
the following activities: (a) any threat or use of force
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of the coastal State, or in any other
manner in violation of the principles of international
law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the
prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal
State; (d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting
the defense or security of the coastal State; (e) the
67 Convention, supra note 5, Art. 18, Part II, Sec. 3.
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launching, landing, or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing, or taking on board of any
military device; (g) the loading or unloading of any
commodity, currency, or person contrary to the
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations of the coastal State; (h) any act of willful
and serious pollution contrary to this Convention; (i)
any fishing activities; (j) the carrying out of research
or survey activities; (k) any act aimed at interfering
with any systems of communication or any other
facilities or installations of the coastal State; (1) any
other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.6"
Applying the facts of Intertanko v. Lowry to Articles 17
through 19 we find that the RIP doctrine can, at least definitionally,
apply to the dispute at hand. The definition of "passage" in Article
18 applies to the type of activity that Intertanko claims the BAP
regulations are hindering. It is "navigation through the territorial sea
for the purpose of traversing that sea without entering internal waters
.... 1169 Also, it is travel that is "continuous and expeditious .... .,70
And this passage is "innocent" because it is "not prejudicial
to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State."
71
Understandably, Washington State might argue that, ifthe Court were
inclined to adopt a broad definition of "good order.... of the coastal
State," that the potential threat of environmental damages would rise
to this level and therefore take Intertanko's activity outside the
definition of "innocent passage" as laid out in Article 19. However,
68 Id. at ArL 19, Part II, Sec. 3.
69 Id at Art. 18, Part II, Sec. 3.
70 Id.
71 Id. at Art. 19, Part I, Sec. 3.
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they would still have to overcome the hurdle of part 2(a)-(g) of
Article 19 where the Convention explicitly explains what types of
activities represent ones that would be prejudicial to the peace, good
order or security of the coastal State. The only one that could
possibly apply would be (h), which is "any act of willful and serious
pollution contrary to this Convention. "I However, "willful" activity
is not what we are talking about here. Intertanko is not undertaking
any willful activity along these lines, therefore none of the exceptions
which would have the effect of taking the activity outside of the
definition of "innocent passage" apply.
Article 21 of the Convention recognizes the authority of the
coastal State to implement their own laws and regulations regarding
a variety of respects.73 Article 21 provides, in part:
1. The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations,
in conformity with the provisions of this Convention
and other rules of international law, relating to
innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect
of all or any of the following: (a) the safety of
navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic; (b)
the protection of navigational aids and facilities and
other facilities or installations; (c) the protection of
cables and pipelines; (d) the conservation of the
living resources of the sea; (e) the prevention of
infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of
the coastal State; (f) the preservation of the
environment of the coastal State and the prevention,
reduction and control of pollution thereof; (g) marine
scientific research and hydrographic surveys; and (h)
the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the
72 Id
73 Id. at Art. 21, Part II, Sec. 3.
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coastal State.
2. Such laws and regulations shall not apply to the
design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign
ships unless they are giving effect to generally
accepted international rules or standards.74
Although sections 1 (d) and 1 (f) of this article purport to give
Washington state broad authority for their BAP regulations, it is
important to take a close reading of the language of this article. The
Convention is careful to emphasize that the laws and regulations
adopted by the coastal State must be "in conformity with the
provisions of the Convention and other rules of international law."'75
As we will see with the following analysis of Article 24, the state
regulations may not "impair this right of innocent passage" provided
for within the Convention. The restrictions allowed by the state in
Article 21 must be reasonable and necessary and not have the
practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent
passage.76
In addition, section 2 of Article 21 states that the coastal
State's laws may not apply to the manning or equipment of the
foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted
international rules or standards. 7  However, several of the
Washington State BAP regulations deal with manning or equipment.
Specifically, WAC 317-21-265, which requires tankers to be
equipped with global positioning system receivers, two separate radar
systems, and an emergency towing system certainly deal with
"equipment." And WAC 317-21-230 through WAC 317-21-255
74 Id
75 Id
76 Id. at Art. 17, Part H1, Sec. 3, Commentary p. 20.
77 Id. at Art. 21, Part I, Sec. 2.
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dealing with personnel policies of training, drug use, evaluations,
work hours, language, and training records all obviously deal with
"manning." Therefore, these regulations should be precluded unless
Washington State can show that these regulations give effect to
generally accepted international rules or standards.
Of special interest is Article 24 of Part II, Section 3. This
article provides, in part:
1. The coastal State shall not hamper the innocent
passage of foreign ships through the territorial sea
except in accordance with this Convention. In
particular, in the application of this Convention or of
any laws or regulations adopted in conformity with
this convention, the coastal State shall not: (a)
impose requirements on foreign ships which have the
practical effect of denying or impairing the right of
innocent passage .... 78
The word "impair" is not defined in the Convention.
However, Webster's Dictionary defines it as "to make worse; to
diminish in quantity, value, excellence, or strength; to do harm to,
damage, or lessen. ' 79 The cumbersome, overreaching BAP
regulations impair Intertanko's right of innocent passage to the extent
that they diminish or make worse their ability to travel the territorial
seas without being hampered.
Similar to OPA 90's savings clause, the Convention addresses
a state's right to establish their own laws for the prevention of
pollution. Section 5 of Part XII of the Convention contains language
on international rules and national legislation to prevent, reduce, and
79 WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 574 (1975).
78 Id. at Art. 21, Part II, Sec. 3.
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control pollution of the marine environment."0 Specifically, Article
211 addresses states' rights and duties for enacting laws to prevent
pollution from vessels."1 Although this article appears to mirror OPA
90's non-preemption language in recognizing a state's right to enact
such legislation, the drafters of the Convention were careful to point
out the limitations such legislation may have on a vessels right of
innocent passage.12 For example, paragraph three of Article 211
states: "This article is without prejudice to the continued exercise by
a vessel of its right of innocent passage...."I83 In addition, paragraph
four, states: "Such laws and regulations shall, in accordance with
Part II, section 3, not hamper innocent passage of foreign vessels."'
The BAP regulations in many ways impair and/or hamper foreign
vessels' rights ofinnocent passage. First, the regulations dealing with
operating procedures are overreaching and much more cumbersome
than existing regulations. For example, WAC 317-21-205, requires
tankers to record positions every fifteen minutes, to write a
comprehensive voyage plan before entering state waters, and to make
frequent compass checks while under way. 5 This regulation has
limited appeal in its potential to prevent catastrophic marine
pollution, especially when weighed against the undue burden it places
on the staff of the vessel. Second, most of the personnel policies are
obsessive and duplicative. They, likewise, have limited potential in
impacting the frequency of pollution from vessels.
But most of all, the BAP regulations hamper foreign vessels'
80 Convention, supra note 5, Art. 211, Part XII, Sec. 5.
81 Id.
82 Id at Art. 21, Part II, Sec. 3.
83 Id. at Art. 211, Part XII, See. 5.
84 Id
85 Wash. Rev. Code § 88A6.205 (1995).
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rights of innocent passage because they are almost impossible to
achieve when reconciled with other coastal state's regulations. A
foreign vessel cannot be expected to potentially adhere to a new set
of regulations every time it enters a new territorial sea. This would
be not only impractical and confusing, it would be next to impossible.
Washington state cannot expect every ship traversing its territorial
seas to rise to unnecessarily elevated standards of operation when the
regulations far exceed any put forth by other coastal states, federal
law, or international law.
In several statutory provisions, Congress has explicitly
recognized and accepted the RIP doctrine which restricts our
domestic regulatory regime and is central to U.S. Navy operations in
foreign territorial seas.86 Section 1223 of Title 33 codifies the
Secretary's power to affect, alter or restrict the operating
requirements of vessels in the navigable waters of the United States
or in any area covered by an international agreement negotiated
pursuant to section 1230 of Title 33.17 In particular, it gives him
power to construct, operate, maintain, improve, or expand vessel
traffic services." This includes taking measures for controlling or
supervising vessel traffic or for protecting navigation and the marine
environment and may include, but need not be limited to, reporting
and operating requirements, surveillance and communications
systems, routing services, and fairways.8 9 Similar to the BAP
regulations, these federally enacted powers have the potential to
impair what could be recognized as a vessels right of innocent
passage. However, explicit in this power is the exception noted in
part (d) of section 1223 which provides:
86 See 33 U.S.C. § 1223(d) (1998); 46 U.S.C. § 3702(e)(1998).
87 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1223, 1230.




(d) Except pursuant to international treaty,
convention, or agreement, to which the United States
is a party, this chapter shall not apply to any foreign
vessel that is not destined for, or departing from, a
port, a port or place subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States and that is in (1) innocent passage
through the territorial sea of the United States .... 90
Also, chapter 37 of Title 46, which consolidates the laws that
are applicable to vessels that transport oil or hazardous material in
bulk as cargo or cargo residue, contains a similar exception to vessels
in innocent passage.91 Section 3702 provides: "This chapter does not
apply to a foreign vessel on innocent passage on the navigable waters
of the United States."' Again, in enacting legislation for the purpose
of ensuring safety at sea as well as environmental protection,
Congress has recognized the need to uphold the rights of foreign
vessels to innocent passage through the territorial sea. If federally
enacted laws cannot reach into this recognizably protected area, then
laws put forth by any particular state should contain the same
limitation.
In addition, the RIP doctrine has been reviewed by the courts,
admittedly with limited success. In Barber v. Hawaii, a citizens
group acting on behalf of boaters affected by state regulations on
mooring fees challenged the constitutionality of the state regulations
and legislation affecting the rights of mariners to anchor and navigate
in ocean waters surrounding the Hawaiian islands.93 The citizens
group argued that the regulations violated the right of innocent
passage expressed in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
90 33 U.S.C. § 1223(d).
91 See 46 U.S.C. § 3702 (1998).
92 Id.
93 Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1185-1186 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Contiguous Zone, a 1958 international treaty of which the United
States is a signatory.94 According to the citizens group, the Hawaiian
regulations interfered with the right of innocent passage through the
territorial sea that was guaranteed to foreign flag vessels under Article
14 of the 1958 Convention.95 The United States District Court for the
District of Hawaii entered judgment for the state.96 The Court of
Appeals agreed, but merely on the basis that the RIP doctrine did not
apply to the dispute at hand because none of the vessels involved in
the dispute were operated under a foreign flag and the passage
involved was not continuous and expeditious.97
Since Congress has explicitly recognized and accepted the
RIP doctrine in the statutory provisions of 33 U.S.C. section 1223(d)
and 46 U.S.C. section 3702(e), and the courts have allowed the
argument to go forward in Barber, then the argument could have been
advanced by Intertanko in the District Court. Although the doctrine
has received limited exposure in the courts, the facts of the dispute at
hand suggest that it might have made a difference in the decision of
Judge Coughenour in ruling that the Washington regulations do not
violate international agreements and is not preempted by federal law.
V. CONCLUSION
Intertanko should have argued in the District Court that the
Washington State BAP regulations hamper their Right of Innocent
Passage in the territorial seas. The doctrine is not only recognized as
customary international law, but is mirrored in federal legislation and
has been reviewed by the courts. The facts of Intertanko v. Lowry
94 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Barber, 42 F.3d at 1195.
95 Barber, 42 F.3d at 1195.
96 Id at 1199.
97 Barber, 42 F.3d at 1195.
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suggest that if the doctrine were argued by Intertanko that Judge
Coughenour might have ruled otherwise and struck down the BAP
regulations because of its conflict with international agreements.
